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Volune 9, NtDJber 2, August 1988 
I. Introduction 
ASPECTS OF COUNTERTRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
William J. Rieber 
University of Wisconsin 
Countertrade or international bu-ter bas enjoyed 
a flourish of activity during the 19808. Bare 
authors have ~ed that countertrade is an 
effective developnent tool for third world countries 
and indeed represents the beginning of a rearrange-
ment of the international econanic order in favour 
of lesser developed. countries. Griffin and Rouse 
(1986, p.178) . state , "that counter-trade is a develop-
ment strategy currently being adopted by leading 
third world countries that may achieve the long 
sought restructuring of the globll econanic order". 
And they assert (p.196) : ''Many countries (including 
South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, 
China, Australia and Canada) insist upon counter-
trade in spite of solid foreign reserve holdings. 
For these industrializing nations, linking trade 
flows is a major tool by which diversification 
of trading p:u-tners and exertion of national sover-
eignty over DIllti-nationals can be achieved." '!be 
Far Eastern Econanic Review in its cover story 
on January 27, 1983 states (p.49) : "By canpelling 
these industrialized countries to accept p:u-t plyment 
in ccmoodi ties the primary producers are circtmventing 
the international pricing mechanisn and achieving 
what decades of negotiations on international cauro-
di ty agrearents and cartels bas failed to achieve". 
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. On the other band, others have suggested that 
countertrade is an aberration refleCting a misguided 
understanding of international trade and finance 
by roc policynakers. For example, Bmks (1983, 
p.179) states : "Any attraction which countertrade 
(and other forms of barter) DRY have for developing 
countries is largely based on a misapprehension 
concerning its ability to arreliorate their difficult 
trade and pl.ynEnts situation in the context of 
a world recession. In practice, countertrade will 
a.lIoost certainly rmke DRtters worse." 
The thesis of the present pl.per is that neither 
of these two views is generally correct. That 
is, the popularity of countertrade does not signal 
the beginning of a new international econanic order 
by shifting terms of trade in favour of developing 
countries nor does it represent ignorance by roc 
policyrmkers. Rather it Sea:ns that countertrade 
is nvre a natural outgrowth of the econanic environ-
ment of the 1980s : the presence of state trading 
agencies in countries with lRlance of pl.ynEnts 
deficits, combined with exchange rate volatility 
and declining nvney growth. 
The outline of the pl.per is as follows. In 
Section II the various types of countertrade are 
defined and examples given. Section III first 
criticizes the claim that countertrade enables 
developing countries to improve their trading terms. 
The experiences of OPEL and ASFAN are contrasted 
to illustrate that the colIDtries roost active in 
countertrade are generally those that sell counter-
traded goods below world IIRrket price levels. 
Section II also examines why countries with lRlance 
of pl.yments deficits are riDre prone to engage in 
countertrade if their external trade is conducted 
largely by state trading agencies. Section IV 
considers how exchange rate volatility and declining 
nvney growth also have contributed to the surge 
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in countertrade. The literature on this aspect 
of countertrade bas generally focused directly 
on IOOdern econcmies. But in the present piper 
the efficiency of barter in primitive economies 
is first examined. 'Ibis analysis of primitive 
econcmies gives further wulerstanding why econcmic 
agents in IOOdern economies, especially state trading 
insti tutions, lIB.y embrace countertrade given uncertain 
exchange rates and liquidity shortages. Section 
V briefly discusses the future prospects of counter-
trade. 
II. Types of Countertrade 
Countertrade can take IIBIlY forms and is estillRted 
to account for anywhere from 5 percent to ·30 percent 
of world tradif. The range is wide because govern-
ments do not routinely record countertrade tran-
sactions in their balance of payments. First, 
there is simple barter. The recent agreaoont by 
the Philippine Boord of Investments and the Indonesian 
goverrment to exchange phosphoric acid fran the 
Philippines for amoonia from Indonesia is an instance 
of this type of countertrade. 
An offset (also called plI'allel blrter or 
counterpurcbase) occurs when a business finn IlD.lSt 
purchase goods often unrelated to its business 
operations as pirt of an international deal. The 
actual counterpurcbase IIB.Y take place over a nul ti-
year period. For example, when International Can-
IOOdities Export Corporation recently exported ferti-
lizer to Indonesia to fulfill a government contract, 
it purchased Indonesian products including cocoo., 
coffee and rubber. 
A buyl:ack (also called import canpens1tion) 
resul ts when piyment to a foreign firm or foreign 
governoont for their capital equiprent or technical 
assistance in constructing a new factory in the 
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local econany is IIBde with output derived fran 
the equipmnt or factory. O:rina bas relied on 
technology am equipmnt supplied by U. S. and Japmese 
finns to develop its oil and cooJ. resources. Oil 
and cooJ. derived over the years fran these investrrent 
projects are often used as payment to the U.S. 
am Japmese fi:rms. 
Finally, bilateral clearing occurs when govern-
rrents of two countries attanpt to 1Blance their 
bilateral trade, and therefore conserve on the 
use of foreign exchange. For example, India's 
import bill for Soviet oil declined in the 1980s 
as the rm.rket price of oil fe:J.l, which led to a 
trade surplus for India with the Soviet Union. 
'!be Soviet Union then asked India to purchase IOOre 
of its goods in order to 1:Rlance their trade. 
III. Countertrade I '!be Tenns of Trade and Payments. Deficits 
Tenns of Trade 
Countertrade is said to allow roc policyrmkers 
to byplss the international pricing systan am 
assist I1X!s in their developmnt plans by improving 
their tenns of trade.2 Yet this view certainly 
misconstrues the pricing process. In . a lBrter 
transaction, as in a roonetary one, it is the relative 
price that IIB.tters. Supply and damnd forces are 
just as important with t:ii.'rtei" as with IOOnet;ary 
exchange. '!bere are IltJ:OOrous examples where prices 
were adjusted in countertrade proposals when there 
were changing rm.rket conditions. Thailand in 1981 
tenninated an ag:reaoont to mrter its IIBize for 
Ramni an fertilizer when high world IlBize prices 
IIBde the deal uneconanic.3 Oil countertrade proposals 
are often altered to reflect changing world prices 
of oil. Such a pricing adjustmmt occurred in 
a mrter of planes fran the United Kingdan for 
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Saudi Arabian Oil 4 when oil prices fell sharply 
during winter 1986. Indeed one gets a clearer 
picture of why sane countries are or not avid counter-
traders by considering their policies in relation 
to world rmrkets for their caooodities. 
OPEC. Consider first <JlJEC. Many of these 
nations are saddled with large foreign debts at 
the sarre t:iroo that cartel production quotas limi. t 
their exports of oil. '!bese nations are inclined 
to bide price discounts on oil through countertrade 
to increase exports. Hence CJ.PEC nations have been 
active countertraders since they have been willing 
to accept prices below existing world levels. 
'!be Saudi Arabian goverIlOOnt bas lamented that 
countertrade leads to lower oil prices despite 
having JB,rticiIRted itself in such deals. 5 Im1ks 
(1985, p.257) reports that in 1984 as nruch as 20 
percent of exports of OPEC was countertraded. 
Indeed it bas been said that "Oil is the currency 
of countertrade." 
Recent reports suggest that oil countertrading 
and price discounting ram.in strong. 6 Libya bas 
offered to supply all of Uganda I s oil imports in 
exchange for coffee, DRize and beans. Libya bas 
evidently given a special price to Uganda to undercut 
other oil exporters. Also, Libya has traded oil 
for capital goods, including a water treatment 
facility, an airforce air shelter and a housing 
canplex. 
Besides trading oil for canoodi ties, Iraq 
bas offered to IRY off foreign debts in oil and 
Iran bas exchanged oil for ceoont rmnufacturing 
caIRCity in a deal with a Turkish finn. Nigeria 
has indicated it is now preIRred to countertrade. 
Oil caIRCi ty in Nigeria is about 2 million 1Brrels 
a day but its daily OPEC quota is 1.6 rrdllion barrels. 
Although Nigerta officially states it will counter-
trade wi thin the quota, it is reported that the 
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COWltertraded oil will likely caoo fran the unused 
capiCi ty . Even non-<JP.Er! oil producers counter-
trade oil. Mexico bas offered to hlrter oil at 
a discount to Nicaragua for agricultural goods 
and raw lIRterials. 
ABEAN. It is useful to contrast the experience 
of ()PE[! with that of certain 7 ABEAN countries 
'lbailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. These countries 
specify that the prices I of their countertraded 
goods should reflect world prices and countertrade 
deals should represent an addition to already existing 
trade. 'Ibis helps explain why they have generally 
been less active in countertrade than OWly OPEC 
nations that readily countertrade oil at discount 
prices. 
'Ibailand set guidelines in 1981 to gOvern 
its COWltertrading. Speci:(ically, 'Ibailand wished 
to increase exports of six ~cultural products: 
rm.ize, cotton, rice, rubber, sugar and tapioca. 
Thailand has found few opportunities to buter 
its agricultural products, as they have been rela-
tively strict to require world prices for their 
bartered goods and that buter trade not substitute 
for existing trade. It is estiDRted that counter-
trading activity through early 1986 was only appro-
x:iJm.tely U.S. $ 175 million, with three of the 
four rmjor deals being rmde wjth &wiet moe. 
countries. 8 
The Iohlaysian goverrmmt introduced counter-
trade policies in 1983 and accepts countertrade 
proposals fran foreign suppliers bidding on goverment 
contracts. These policies attaopt to shift exports 
away fran traditional raw lIRterials to higher value 
added goods; e. g. , logs, tin and crude JRlm oil 
are excluded fran countertrade. Malaysia requires 
that its countertraded exports be 'sold either a) 
to the COWltry that supplies the imports fulfilling 
the goveI"IUEnt contract or b) to designated third 
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countries. In this way the goverorent seeks to 
insure that cotmtertrade does not rrerely replace 
cash trade. 'lbrougb. Ma.rcl:1 1985 cotmtertrade totalled 
about M $330 million (U. S. $132 million) ~ 
Of the three COWltries, Indonesia bas been 
the lOOSt active in countertrading since introducing 
policies in 1981 to praoote non-oil and gas exports 
IDclUdiI1g PlYWOOd, rtlbber, tiiDlJer, cocoo. beBilS 
and textiles. The governrent requires foreign 
finns winning oajor goverorent contracts to purchase 
Indonesian goods equivalent in value to oaterials 
imported for the goverorent project. Indonesia 
though bas not closely IOOni tored whether counter-
traded goods satisfy its additionality req~nt 
and represent new trade. Foreign suppliers taki ng 
countertraded goods are penni tted to assign these 
goods to traders who sell than in the best available 
oarkets. It is difficult to know in exactly what 
countries these goods eventually end-up and therefore 
whether countertrade displaced SCIre cash trade. 
This assignoont rule along with the vigour in which 
Indonesia praooted COWltertrade , given declining 
oil and gas revenues, led to approxiImtely U.S. 
$1.5 billion in cotmtertrade contracts through 
1986. But recently activity bas declined. It 
is estioated that a total of about U.s. $200 million 
worth of deals were rm.de in the two years 1~ 
and 1987 caopu-ed with U. S. $400 million in 1985. 
The goveI"IlOOnts of two other ASFAN cotmtries, 
the Philippines and Singapore, have not been actively 
involved in COWltertrade. Philippine countertrade 
bas been kept to a rnjnimlD due in put to Inter-
national Monetary Fund restrictions, and Singapore 
bas a free trade policy. However, Singapore in 
1986 and 1987 granted pioneer tax exanption status 
for five years with possibility of extension to 
nine trading ccmpmi es, including Qu-gill trading 
of the U. S., to establish subsidiaries in Singapore 
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enf?iJgi ng in countertrade. Singapore is already 
a center of entrepot activity in Southeast Asia 
and is intent in canpeting IOOre effectively with 
Hong Kong for countertrade business . 
Countertrade then surely cannot be an effective 
neans of bYJDSSing the existing v.urld pricing struc-
ture, except that it nay pennit countries (e.g., 
CJI>OC) to price discr:iminate IOOre easily since counter-
trade deals are IOOre' canplicated and less t:ra.nsp1.rent 
than overt DDIletary agreanents. The international 
pricing system (i.e., world supply and demand) 
is not being circunvented; rather oarkets are being 
segregated with nations initiating m.rter often 
accepting lower prices on m.rtered goods. On these 
exports the nation incurs a tenns of trade deterio-
ration, although the country's (and the world I s) 
real incam DRy increase since the price of these 
exports still exceeds oarg'inal cost. 11 
Ihl ance of PaYIOOnts fufici ts 
Another reason generally given for the attractiveness 
of countertrade in the 1980s is the l:Blance of 
JRytOOIlts deficits experienced. by oany countries.12 
Yet 00lance of JRYIOOnts deficits are not a unique 
feature of the 1980s. fuficits (and surpluses) 
'Were DIlch IOOre a pu:t of the Bretton Woods Systan 
(1944-1971) where exchange rates ~ fixed, although 
adjustable. International m.rter did not flourish 
during this period or in the 1970s for that DRtter.13 
In fact, countries today have additional tools 
to address JRYIOOnts deficits not available to policy-
DBkers during Bretton Woods : they can alter their 
excl1ange rates, gradually or drastically, without 
prior approval by the International Monetary Fund 
or even allow their currencies to floo.t. 
It is a special cbaracteristic of countries 
experiencing deficits in the 1980s that DBkes buter 
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appealing. J.tmy of these countries, often I1X!s, 
conduct much of their international trade through 
state agencies.14 State trading agencies naturaliy 
take into account the country IS lBlance of IRyroonts 
in its trade behaviour. To the extent that lBrter 
can provide a closer natching of exports and imports, 
penni t price discrimination or "hide" foreign exchange 
fran creditor bulks, b1.rter will be a useful tool 
for these agenC1es. 
If a deficit country relies on private domestic 
f:inn.s to conduct the nation I s international trade, 
then no large-scale resort to blrter will likely 
occur .15 Private finns are interested in their 
own talance sheets and incaoo statarents and not 
the country's 00lance of IRyroonts. lD.rtering the 
finn I s products for say fertilizer will generally 
not be initiated by the finn since its employees 
and shareholders do not wish to be IBid in fertilizer. 
GoverIlOOnt agencies, on the other band, do 
not IRrticipl.te in international trade for profit. 
Nor do guverrrrent employees get IBid directly fran 
the receipts of foreign sales. Bather the imports 
received fran blrtering exports nay be destined 
for use or CODSlIDption anywhere in the econcmy 
where say fertilizer is in damnd. lIence, state 
trading agencies will DDre likely anbrace lBrter 
than private f:inn.s since econany-wide imports and 
exports can be better lBlanced and because imported 
goods can be directed to various IRrts of the country 
through state distribution facilities. 
IV. Money, Barter and EXchange Bates 
Pr:imi ti ve :&onanies 
A caIIOOD. perception shrowding countertrade nay 
be, ''rooney was invented to replace blrter, not 
the other way around." It nay seen that any resort 
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to blrter, daoostic or international, narks a rever-
sion to an antiquated IOOthod of conducting transac-
tions. Yet it cannot be DBintained that 1:nrter 
was ever the priImry means of trade, even in the 
IOOre primitive econanies. 'lbat is, it is a mispercep-
tion to suggest that a DEditIO of exchange was intro-
duced to replace 1:nrter for all tiIOO by enlightened 
individuals who eventually (or all of a sudden) 
realized the greater efficiency associated with 
IOOnetary exchange. IIrleed Hunpbrey (1985, pA8) 
asserts ''No example of a 1:B.rter ecoricmy, pure 
and simple, bas ever been described, let alone 
the anergence fran it of lOOney ; all available 
ethnography suggests that there bas never been 
such a thing." au-ter and a DEditIO of exchange 
have existed side by side and rmrket puticipmts 
bad a choice as to which fonn of exchange they 
found IOOre attractive~6 in lIBIly cases the DEditIO 
of exchange was "primitive" Or "cauoodity" lOOney 
such as· rice, wbales teeth, shells, cattle, rm.ize 
or salt instead of currency and checking deposits. 
Nevertheless, imividuals often found 1:nrter IOOre 
convenient and econanical than the use of IIDDey, 
be it caooodi ty , fiat, or lm1k lOOIley. 
There nay be several reasons for this preference 
for 1:nrter. A 1:nrter trade can accanplish in one 
transactj on what rmy take (at J fflFj1:) two transactWns 
with a DEdiun of exchange .. For i.nstance, a fishenm.n 
can 1:nrter fish directly for the furs of a hunter. 
With a meditlO of exchange, the fishermm first 
sells fish for lOOIley and in turn exchanges DDlley 
for furs. Of course, a double coincidence of wants 
IWSt be lOOt before the single 1:nrter transaction 
daninates the use of lOOI1ey. Yet as Einzig (1986, 
p. 343) points out "the' double coincidence I ( 
to quote the word of Jevons) that must arise is 
by no IIBlllS difficult to achieve in a smll c.cmmmity 
where everybody knows a great deal about everybody 
else I s products and :requirEments. 
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OJanges in lOOney supply IIRY affect the preference 
for lRrter versus IIDnetary trade. Einzig (1966, 
p.417) states : 
"As a rule the relative extent of IIDnetary 
and natural econanies is liable to 
changes, and changes in the volune 
or value of lOOney are liable to· affect 
it. A IOOderate rise in prices through 
an expmsion in the volune of IIDney 
tends to increase the proportion of 
lIDuetary econany to natural econany , 
because an increased Illmber of people 
are taopted by higher prices to sell 
against IIDney rather than lRrter their 
goods or services. Conversely a decline 
in prices due to IIDnetary causes leads 
towards an increase in the relative 
importance of natural econany. This 
phenarenon is noticeable als:> in primi ti ve 
COIJIIlIli ties using IOOdern UXJ[ley. During 
the depression of the thirties, the 
sharp decline of prices of local products 
in IIRIlY prrts of the world resul ted 
in a reluctance to accept lower prices 
in lOOney, and rmny people reverted 
to lRrter." 
Moreover, while IIDney nay be used for darestic 
transactions, lRrter nay be chosen for foreign 
trade. For example, even into the 1930s the inhabi-
tants of the Yap island group in the Caroline Islands 
in the West Pacific avoided the use of foreign 
currencies because the currencies were subject 
to sharp fluctuations in their international value 
and acceptabili ty . Although lRrter and "stone" 
lOOney were used for darestic trade on the Yap islands,l,. 
foreign trade was generally conducted through tarterl / . 
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EXchange Rates in lItxiern Fconanies 
What then of countertrade in the current world 
econany ? If rmrket pirticipmts have access to 
a SOJirlsticated mIltilateral p:lyuents systan, then 
why choose international tarter rather than enjoying 
the fullest benefits of a IIEditm of exchange ? 
Consider a hypothetical example of trade rurong 
four countries : Iridonesia,' the Philippines, Japm 
and the United States. one possible trading p:lttern 
would be as follows. The Indonesian gove:rrmmt 
exports rubber to Japm with p:lyoEnt in yen. It 
then sells these yen for pesos to purchase sugar 
fran the Philippines. Over the saroo period, the 
Philippine gove:rment sells sugar in the U.S. 
for dollars and then exchanges dollars for rupiah 
to purchases Indonesian rubber. An alternative 
schere, for Indonesia and -the Philippines at least, 
would be for state ministers of both countries 
to agree to lRrter rubber for sugar. State trading 
agencies, by identifying a double coiJicidence of 
wants, achieve their export and import preferences 
with one transaction. 
There are saoo canplications associated with 
the m.rter transaction, as there III:l.y be serre :imlnlance 
between the respective volures of . rubber and sugar 
that the tvuo countries wish to trade. Yet this 
irnlRlance III:l.y be slight enough to justify avoiding 
the series of monetary transactions cited above, 
especially if exchange rates are not rigidly fixed. 
With fluctuating exchange rates the potential adverse 
change in exchange rates during the t:iIre in which 
foreign currency is held adds an elerent of risk 
to the IOOnetary transactions. 
Another problan with IOOnetary exchange occurs 
if say the Philippines wishes to import the rubber 
before it actually exports the sugar. The Philippines 
III:l.y be unable to obtain credit to finance the purchase 
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of rubber because of a OOlance of plyroonts deficit 
and a large foreign debt. But such financing IIRy 
be implici tly given to the Philippines through 
a OOrter a.g:ree:IEnt when the Philippines agrees 
to ship the sugar at saoo agreed-upon tiIoo after 
the rubber bas been imported. 
The argtlllEnts above suggest that it is nat 
surprising that international 1:Brter would increase 
a situation that characterizes the 198Os. The 
Bretton Woods Adjustable Peg Systan provided reason-
able exchange rate stability fran 1944 to 1971 
since currencies were pegged to the U. S. dollar . 
The 1970s, al though no longer a period of fixed 
exchange rates, witnessed rrore stability than the 
1980s. For instance, fran 1971 through 1979, the 
average annual change in the effective exchange 
rate of the U.S. dollar against other O.E.C.D. 
currencies was 3.8 percent. Fran 1980 through 
1986 the average annual exchange rate change of 
the dollar against O.E.C.D. Currencies was 7.6 
percent}..8 The dollar declined. in value by approxi-
IIRtely 40 percent a~inst the two other IIRjor curren-
cies, the JaplDese yen and West Gernan nark, fran 
February 1985 to March 1988. Greater exchange 
rate volatility adds risk to using foreign currency 
in conducting international trade, therefore, inter-
national OOrter becares relatively roore attractive. 
IIbnetary Growth in Modern Econanies 
The historical experience suggests that OOrter 
grows when there is either too IIIlch lOOney and hyper-
inflation 19 or too little lOOney in the econany. 
In the absence of perfect wage and price flexibility, 
a shortage of rroney will IIEWl a contraction of 
econanic acti vi ty and roore limits on the profitable 
division of labor. Fconanic agents naturally seek 
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to overcar:e this shortage of DDIley by utilizing 
other rreans to facilitate trade. The worldwide 
contraction in daoostic DDIley supplies and the 
depression of the 1000s led developed countries 
to show greater preference for m.rter. In EUrope 
especially, bilateniJ.. trade agreanents were IIDde 
between govern:oonts to conserve on the use of lOOney. 20 
The weighted average of tJ:re real IOOIley supply 
in the 21 lmdi ng industrial countries increased 
approx:iJm.tely 1.57 percent per year fran 1970 through 
1979. Fran 1980 through 1985 the real IOOD.eY supply 
in these countries increased approx:i.Jm.tely .53 
percent per year. '!be real DDOOy supply in these 
countries fell by approx:i.Jm.tely 2.25 percent 2F 
year during the four year period 1979-1982. 
The relative decline in the rate of growth of rooney 
also helps explain the growing appeal of counter-
trade. 22 . 
v. The Future of Countertrade 
Will countertrade continue to grow in popularity 
and perhaps account for as much as 50 percent of 
world trade by the· year 2000, as predicted by Jaroos 
Walsh of the U.S. ~pu1Ioont of Cauoorce ?23 Whether 
this growth does take place will certainly depend 
on the volatility of exchange rates and especially 
the U.S. dollar ~te,-_BDIlC_tary_poliey in OEED eoun 
tries, and the pervasiveness of state trncljng agencies 
in developing econanies. It is very difficult 
to predict the course of future exchange rates 
or IOOnetary growth in the OErD. But the extent 
of state trading in developing countries DRY depend 
in IRrt 00. the trend in DIlDy countries to privatize 
activities fOI'lOOrly undertaken by goverooont. 
Privatization schaoos are being implamnted or 
at least being seriously considered in Indonesia, 
where over 200 state finos are being considered 
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for sale; Malaysia, port facilities and sewage 
and water supply facilities may be privatized; 
Rrllippines, where over 400 state finns may be 
sold; Pakistan, considering privatizing lBsic indus-
tries that were originally nationalized in 1972; 
Thailand, a state bmk and state zinc refinery 
may be sold; Sri lanka, its state-run telecrnmmi-
catjoos authorjty and state=owned tea estates IIBY 
be privatized; India, where a general privatization 
of gegJOOnts of the public sector including the 
telecmmmications and airline industries may take 
place; and China, with its econcmic refoI1ILS, to 
name sare examples. The International Ib:letary 
Fund, World Blnk and the U.S. Agency for International 
D:welopnent have pushed privati:zation in DBllY deve-
loping countries. If these programs achieve the 
desired results of lower budget deficits and greater 
production efficiencies,. then the move to privatiza-
tion will continue. In. JRrticular, goverorents 
may relinquish sare of their invol vaoont in inter-
national trade and the role and scope of state 
trading may diminish. Countertrade should decline 
as IOOre trade is left in private bands. 
Yet ~ goverIllHlts have not been as active 
in privati:zation and are unlikely to reduce their 
role in oil production and trading. Moreover the 
world share market crash in October 1987 may lead 
to delays or indefinite postpollalEnts of sare priviti-
:zation plans. Hence, it is perhaps too early to 
tell whether both the overall i.nJpJct of pri vi ti:zation 
and its JRrticular effect on state trading and 
COWltertrade will be significant. 
70 William J. Rieber, Aspects of Countertrade 
FOOTNOTES 
1. See for example Cohen and Zysmn (1986, pp.41-42), 
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p.19. 
6. See recnet issues of Fmuooney Trade Finance Report 
and Trade Finance. 
7. Indonesia is also a neober of OP.E[! but it does 
not countertrade oil. 
8. See Thumm (1986, p.14). 
~. ;::;ee ..&Jr(]]X)Iley Traae .H.nance Hepon, .June .l.~, 
pA3. 
10. See Trade Finance, Septanber 1987, p.41. 
11. Cooper (1984) and especially Bmks (1985) provide 
thorough discussions as to wby d<JlEstic and inter-
national price controls can lead to production 
surpluses and a resort to countertrade. See also 
Rieber (1982) for a general equilibritm roodel 
of international price discrimination. 
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12. See for instance Walsh (1983) and Czinkota and 
Talbot (1986), aroong lIBD.y others. 
13. Parter did expwd to SCIDe extent during the 1970s 
as East-West trade grew. The preference for lBrter 
then was a result of the nonconverti viIi ty of 
the currencies of mmy EaSte:r ft countries. Inter-
national b:.u Ler between om e market oriented econo 
mies did not surge until the 198Os. For further 
discussion of this point, see Cohen and Zysmn 
(1986) . 
14. :amks (1983, p.174) cites India, where perhaps 
70 percent of imports involve state agencies. 
15. The importance of state involvaoont in international 
trade in exp] ai oj ng the rise of countertrade is 
underscored by Cohen and Zy~ (1986). 
16. See also IlUton (1982) for a succinct discussion 
of lRrter. 
17. For a further discussion of the trading in Yap, 
see Einzig (1966, pp.36-40). 
18. See OEU> :&x>nanic Outlook, 42, ~r 1987, 
p.l95. 
19. See llirnbusch and Fischer (1986) for an examination 
of the Genmn, Austrian and Iblish hyperinflations 
during the 1920s. There is also a discussion 
of the Italian hyperinflation of the 1940s and 
the recent periods of high inflation in Isreal' 
and Argentina. 
20. See:amks (1983, pp.177-178) for further discussion 
of bilateral trade moong European countries during 
the depression years. Ellis (1945) provides the 
sani na] analysis of the effects of bilate:raliBD. 
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21. See International Financial Statistics Inter-
national Monetary FW1d, various issues; canputations 
by the autlior. In 1986 the real IOOlley supply 
in these countries increased by 9.2 percent. 
A continuation of this trend should reduce counter-
trade, all else equal. 
22. For related perspectives on the recent . worldwide 
contraction and the role of exchange rates in 
explaining the surge in countertrade, see &u1ks 
(1983), Business International, August 31, 1984, 
pp.273-275, Cooper (1984) and Griffin and Rouse 
(1986). 
23. 1ms prediction by James Walsh, an econanist, 
is reported in Cooper (1984, p.36). 
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